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Comparative Performance of Cooperative
Equity Retirement Plans
Jeffrey S. Royer
This paper compares the performance of revolving fund, percentage-of-all-equities,
and base capital plans, and special plans for redeeming equity held by estates or based on
member age. It also examines how the performance of the base capital plan is affected by
changes in the base period, relaxing the equity requirements for underinvested members,
and a variable cash patronage refund program. The base capital plan performs better than
other systematic plans but places financial burdens on young members. Two modifications
can mitigate that problem with only a slight diminution in performance. Special plans
benefit cooperatives operating revolving fund plans the most.
Keywords: Agricultural cooperatives, equity retirement, revolving fund plan, percentageof-all-equities plan, base capital plan, special plans, proportionality

Introduction
Equity allocated to individual members plays a critical role in financing agricultural cooperatives. Although retained earnings not allocated to members have
become an increasingly important source of equity in recent years, U.S. Department
of Agriculture (USDA) data show that allocated equity still accounted for 56.9 percent of the $45.0 billion in total equity held in U.S. agricultural cooperatives in
2019 (USDA 2021).
The use of allocated equity usually comes with an expectation that the equity
allocated to an individual member will eventually be redeemed in cash as it is replaced by newer allocations. Cooperative principles, which serve as the de facto
definition of what cooperatives are and how they differ from other forms of business organization, have implications for the equity retirement practices of cooperatives. Specifically, the principles of service at cost and member ownership imply
that members should finance cooperatives in proportion to use and cooperatives
have an obligation to retire equity held by inactive and overinvested members (Cobia et al. 1982). Recent articulations of cooperative principles explicitly include
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financing in proportion to patronage.1 In 1979, the expectation that cooperatives
should retire member equity in a timely manner was reinforced by a U.S. General
Accounting Office (GAO) report that recommended legislation that would require
cooperatives to retire member equity within a prescribed time period if they did not
develop better equity retirement programs (GAO 1979). Although federal and state
statutes do not contain specific requirements for equity retirement,2 proposals calling for mandatory equity retirement have been discussed in both Congress and state
legislatures.3
During the past 40 years, researchers have given considerable attention to examining and improving the programs agricultural cooperatives use to accumulate
and retire member equity. In particular, papers by Royer and Cobia (1984), Barton
and Schmidt (1988), and Kenkel (2020) have focused on comparing the performance of alternative equity retirement plans. Those studies analyzed both systematic equity retirement plans, including the revolving fund plan, the percentage-ofall-equities plan (called the percentage plan herein), and the base capital plan, and
special equity retirement plans, including those for redeeming equity held by estates

1

USDA defines three cooperative principles, including a user-owner principle that implies that
members who currently benefit from a cooperative should be the ones who finance it and that the
burdens of financing the cooperative should reflect the benefits a member receives (USDA 1987).
Barton (1989) goes so far as to present a set of proportional principles, including one that states that
equity should be provided in proportion to patronage.
2

The state incorporation statutes under which cooperatives are organized govern their relationships
with members regarding equity allocations. Under the statutes, the procedures for the redemption
of member equity are usually contained in a cooperative’s articles of incorporation, bylaws, marketing agreements, or equity certificates. None of the statutes requires a cooperative to adopt a
systematic equity retirement plan or specifies a mandatory revolving period or retirement date for
equity in general (Baarda 1982). Some statutes include provisions for the mandatory redemption of
equity, but those provisions generally apply only to specific circumstances such as the death, withdrawal, or expulsion of a member. In those cases, the board of directors is required to appraise the
value of the member’s property interests in the cooperative and return them in cash within a specified period of time. However, the cooperative is generally granted considerable discretion in how
those interests are defined. The cooperative’s bylaws may define property interests narrowly to
exclude equity accumulated through patronage (Cobia et al. 1982). For example, model bylaws
published by USDA (Frederick 1990) suggest that the property interests to be returned to a member
upon termination may be limited to the purchase price of the member’s voting share of common
stock, or the membership fee in a nonstock cooperative, and may exclude retained patronage investments.
3

For example, a bill passed by the U.S. House of Representatives, but not by the Senate, would
have included a provision in the Revenue Act of 1969 requiring cooperatives to redeem the noncash
portion of patronage refunds within 15 years (GAO 1979).
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or based on a member’s age.4 The studies utilized several criteria to evaluate the
performance of equity retirement plans, including proportionality, member cash
flow, and capital requirements. Chief among those criteria is proportionality, which
measures the extent to which members provide equity in proportion to their use of
a cooperative.
In the studies, members were assumed to have identical histories of patronage
and investment, and to be uniformly distributed over time. In addition, the ratio of
new equity investments to patronage was assumed constant. Under those assumptions, a single relationship between patronage and member age could be used to
represent the changes in both patronage and investment that occur during the course
of an individual member’s farming career and the distribution of total patronage
and investments across all members according to age. The assumptions also imply
a steady-state system in which growth in allocated equity is zero.5
Using the age-patronage relationship to represent equity retirement both over
time and across members is a convenient way to construct a framework for comparing the performance of equity retirement plans. However, the approach does
4

Under a systematic equity retirement plan, member equity is retired on a regular basis according
to generally applied criteria that can be taken into account in the cooperative’s financial budgeting
process. In the revolving fund plan, equity is retired on a first-in/first-out basis as the oldest allocations are replaced by new ones. In the percentage plan, a percentage of all member equity is redeemed each year regardless of when it was allocated. In a base capital plan, each member’s equity
requirement is readjusted annually according to the cooperative’s capital needs and the proportion
of its business attributable to the member during a moving base period. Members who are underinvested continue to make equity contributions in the form of retained patronage refunds, per-unit
capital retain deductions, or direct cash investments. Overinvestment members may no longer be
required to make equity investments and may begin receiving at least partial redemption of excess
investments. Under special equity retirement plans, equity is retired on an irregular basis in response
to particular circumstances that cannot generally be taken into account in the budgeting process.
Special plans include plans that redeem equity held by estates or by members who are of a certain
age or are no longer farming. The most recent USDA survey of the equity retirement practices of
U.S. agricultural cooperatives (Eversull 2010) found that 44.3 percent of local cooperatives that
redeemed member equity in 2008 employed revolving fund plans. Of those that redeemed equity,
11.0 percent used percentage plans and 3.5 percent used base capital plans. The equity held by
estates was redeemed by 44.3 percent of the cooperatives, and 26.9 percent of the organizations
redeemed equity based on member age. Often, special plans for retiring the equity held by estates
or members of a particular age were used in conjunction with systematic plans. In some cases, a
cooperative may operate more than one systematic plan as the result of a merger or because it is in
the process of transitioning from one plan to another.
5

Base capital plans were not included in the Royer and Cobia (1984) analysis because of computational similarities between the base capital and revolving fund plans under the condition of no
growth. Specifically, if overinvestments are immediately redeemed, a base capital plan with a base
period of x years will operate in the same manner as a revolving fund plan with a revolving period
of x years. A proof is available from the author.
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not take into account the economic variables that affect a cooperative’s ability to
accumulate and retire member equity. For example, the approach does not permit
consideration of growth in allocated equity, which is important for three reasons.
First, equity growth is normally expected; in fact, cooperatives typically plan for
and pursue growth. Second, the rate of growth in allocated equity is one of the
economic variables that determine a cooperative’s ability to accumulate and retire
equity, as this paper discusses. Third, growth can create situations in which a cooperative’s business volume and demand for equity are increasing while an individual member’s patronage is declining, as during the later years of a farming career. Such a situation can have important implications for the proportionality of
equity retirement plans.
This paper takes a different approach for analyzing the performance of equity
retirement plans. Although it employs an age-patronage relationship similar to
those used in earlier studies, the relationship is only used to represent how a typical
member’s patronage and investment change over time. The relationship is not used
to determine the amount of equity the cooperative accumulates or retires. Instead,
equity accumulation and retirement are determined according to a set of key economic variables, including the rate of growth. The values for those variables are
calculated for a typical cooperative from USDA data. This approach allows growth
in allocated equity to be incorporated into the analysis, consistent with the growth
evident in the data.
The analysis reported here focuses on comparing the performance of the revolving fund, percentage, and base capital systematic equity retirement plans and special plans for redeeming equity held by estates or based on member age. The paper
also examines how the performance of the base capital plan is affected by changes
in the length of the base period, relaxing the equity requirements for underinvested
members, and operating a variable cash patronage refund program in conjunction
with the plan.
Because the disparity index used to measure proportionality in the Royer and
Cobia (1984) and Barton and Schmidt (1988) analyses is based on an assumption
that the cooperative’s equity is fixed, that measure cannot be applied to cases in
which there is growth. This analysis employs an alternative measure of proportionality that allows for equity growth. It also applies several other concepts not previously used to evaluate the performance of equity retirement plans. In particular,
this paper introduces the use of opportunity costs to represent the costs the cooperative incurs when members are underinvested relative to patronage as well as the
costs members incur when they are overinvested. This paper also offers explanations for the low use of base capital plans, and the high incidence of special plans
among cooperatives with revolving fund plans.
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Models
The analysis is based on the financial interactions between a typical cooperative
and member. The member purchases farm inputs or markets farm commodities
through the cooperative and receives patronage refunds. The noncash portions of
the patronage refunds are retained by the cooperative to provide equity capital that
is allocated to the member and eventually redeemed in cash as it is replaced by
newer allocations.
The cooperative and member are modeled separately. The cooperative model
is based on a growth model of an agricultural cooperative in which the accumulation and retirement of member allocated equity is related to the values of several
key economic variables. The member model is based on an age-sales function estimated from cross-sectional data in a manner similar to several earlier studies. The
interactions between the cooperative and member are represented in spreadsheet
models that simulate the accumulation and retirement of member equity on an annual basis for the various equity retirement plans.
Because the focus of this paper is on the accumulation and retirement of equity
allocated to members, the equity in the models consists exclusively of allocated
equity. Unallocated equity from retained earnings is not considered except in the
calculation of the rate of return on equity used in the analysis.
Cooperative Model
The accumulation and retirement of allocated equity by the cooperative is based
on a growth model (Royer 1993) in which the ability of the cooperative to retire or
revolve allocated equity is related to the proportion of patronage refunds paid in
cash (c), the rate of return on equity ( re ), and the rate of equity growth (g). The
values of those variables are assumed to remain constant during the period of analysis, as they are in the spreadsheet models used to simulate the operation of the
equity retirement plans.
In the cooperative model, retained patronage refunds serve as a source for both
equity retirement and growth. Specifically, a fundamental relationship in the model
states that equity retirement and equity growth must equal retained patronage refunds:

ERt + gEt −1 = (1 − c ) re Et −1

(1)

where ERt is equity retired in year t and Et −1 is equity at the end of the previous
year (beginning of year t). The second term on the left represents equity growth,
and the term on the right represents retained patronage refunds.
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Other relationships important to equity financing can be derived from equation
(1). Solving for ERt , funds available for equity retirement in year t are the residual
of net income after the payment of cash patronage refunds and equity growth:

ERt = (1 − c)re − g  Et −1 for g  0 .

(2)

The rate at which the cooperative retires equity is determined by dividing equation
(2) by Et −1 :
E=

ERt
= (1 − c)re − g for g  0 .
Et −1

(3)

For a cooperative operating a revolving fund, it can be shown (Royer 1993) that the
length of the revolving period is


g 
log 1 −
(1 − c)re 

T =−
for (1 − c)re  g
log(1 + g )

(4)

when g  0 .6
Most of the parameters used in this model are based on data on U.S. agricultural
cooperatives contained in the annual USDA reports of cooperative statistics (USDA
2021, and earlier). Table 1 shows the data used to calculate the rates of return on
allocated and total equity and the rate of equity growth. The rates of return on
equity were calculated by dividing net income after taxes by equity in the previous
year in a manner consistent with the model. Thus, the rates of return on allocated
equity are usually greater than those reported by USDA.
The determination of an appropriate value for the rate of return on equity is
complicated by the fact that many cooperatives accumulate unallocated equity from
retained earnings withheld from net income. Although the USDA dataset includes
balance sheet data on both allocated and unallocated equity, it does not report the

6

The length of the revolving period is T = 1 (1 − c ) re when g = 0 (Royer 1993). In that case,

E = (1 − c ) re and T = 1 E . However, the assertion that T = 1 E (Eversull 2010) is correct only
when g = 0 . When g  0 , the relationship between E and T is more complex as a comparison of
equations (3) and (4) demonstrates.
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Table 1. Rates of return on equity and rates of equity growth, 2010–19
Year

Net income Allocated
after taxes
equity

Total
equity

Return on
Growth in
Return on
Growth in
allocated
allocated
total equity
total equity
equity
equity

Billion dollars

Rate

2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019

4.016
3.961
5.015
5.521
5.556
6.466
7.030
6.886
6.166
6.790
7.756

16.190
17.673
17.795
19.169
21.531
22.473
24.229
24.003
25.008
25.936
26.114

23.807
25.804
27.906
29.860
34.559
37.596
40.514
40.899
42.645
44.417
45.923

0.2447
0.2837
0.3103
0.2899
0.3003
0.3128
0.2842
0.2569
0.2715
0.2990

0.1664
0.1943
0.1979
0.1861
0.1871
0.1870
0.1700
0.1508
0.1592
0.1746

0.0916
0.0069
0.0772
0.1233
0.0437
0.0782
-0.0094
0.0419
0.0371
0.0069

0.0839
0.0814
0.0700
0.1574
0.0879
0.0776
0.0095
0.0427
0.0415
0.0339

Average for
2010–19

6.115

22.393

37.012

0.2853

0.1773

0.0497

0.0686

Source: Data from annual USDA reports of cooperative statistics (USDA 2021, and earlier).

amount of net income that is withheld as retained earnings. Without a correction
for retained earnings, the rate of return on allocated equity overstates the ability of
the typical cooperative to retire allocated equity. Therefore, the lower rate of return
on total equity is preferable because it better represents the ability of the cooperative
to retire allocated equity while also accumulating unallocated equity. The same
approach was taken in a recent study of capital structure and equity retirement in
U.S. farm supply and grain marketing cooperatives (Royer and McKee 2021). In
that study, the rate of return on total equity was used to explain the ability of cooperatives to retire allocated equity. The regression coefficients related to the rate of
return were highly significant, suggesting its usefulness in the current analysis.
Consequently, the average rate of return on total equity for the 2010–19 period
was initially chosen for use. The rate of growth used is the compound rate of
growth in allocated equity over the same period. The proportion of cash patronage
refunds was calculated from the most recent USDA financial profile of agricultural
cooperatives (Eversull 2011).
The spreadsheet models for the revolving fund plans require that the revolving
period is assigned an integer value. Substituting the values for re , g, and c based
on the USDA data into equation (4) yields a revolving period of 16.66 years. That
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value was set to 17 years by reducing re slightly.7 Thus, the parameter values used
in the simulations were re = 0.1750 , g = 0.0490 , and c = 0.4970 .
Total patronage of the cooperative’s members in year t is related to total equity
by this relationship:
Pt =

re



Et −1

(5)

where  is the ratio of net income from sales to total gross revenue. The value of
 was calculated from USDA data for the 2013–19 period using net income less
service income and other operating income to represent net income from sales.
Member Model
Economists have long postulated the concept of a farmer life cycle in which
economic activity grows during the early years of a farmer’s career and then declines in later years (Tauer 2019). However, longitudinal data are unavailable for
estimating such a life cycle for use in this analysis. Instead, the age-patronage relationship used here is based on a quadratic age-sales function estimated from
cross-sectional data in a manner similar to studies by Barton and Schmidt (1988),
Royer and Shihipar (1997), and Kenkel (2020). According to Kenkel, that approach
produces a reasonable approximation of the age-sales relationships exhibited in
case studies.
The age-sales relationship for the typical member was estimated from data in
the 2012 Census of Agriculture (USDA 2014), the most recent census to report the
market value of agricultural products sold by the age of principal operator. Average
sales per producer was calculated by dividing the market value of agricultural products sold and government payments by the number of principal operators in each
of seven age groups: under 25 years, 25 to 34 years, 35 to 44 years, . . . , 75 years
and older. The observations for the census age groups were assumed to occur respectively at ages 20, 30, 40, . . . , and 70, following the approach outlined by Simonton (1989) in a similar application.
This function served as the estimated equation:

Sales ( Age ) =  + 1 Age +  2 Age2 + 

7

(6)

As it turns out, the 17-year revolving period appears to represent U.S. local cooperatives quite
well. According to Eversull (2010), when local cooperatives that used revolving fund plans in 2008
were grouped by total assets, the average revolving period ranged from 13 to 18 years, and the most
common average was 17 years.
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Table 2. Results of regression used to estimate age-sales relationship

Variable

Estimated
coefficient

Standard
error

t value

Probability
value

Intercept
Age
Age 2

-0.2680
0.3595
-0.0058

0.6073
0.0475
0.0008

-0.44
7.57
-7.56

0.6889
0.0048
0.0048

F statistic
R2

29.04
0.9509

0.0109

where Sales is average sales per producer and Age is career age (chronological age
minus 15 years) such that Age = 0 at the onset of the producer’s farming career.
According to Simonton (1988), the quadratic form in equation (6) has been used
frequently to represent the relationship between an individual’s age and productivity. The expected signs of the coefficients are   0 , 1  0 , and  2  0 .
The results of an ordinary least squares regression used to estimate the age-sales
relationship are reported in table 2. The estimated coefficients for both Age and
Age2 are significant and of the expected signs ( ˆ  0, ˆ  0 ). Although the es1

2

timated coefficient for the intercept is not of the expected sign ( ˆ  0 ), it is not
significant. The estimation of an alternative model without an intercept yielded
similar values for ̂1 and ̂ 2 . However, it did not produce as good of a fit, as
measured by the root mean squared error. Accordingly, the results shown in table
2 were used to construct the age-sales relationship used in this analysis.8
Figure 1 shows the estimated age-sales relationship used in the simulations.9
The unlabeled points near the curve represent the census observations included in

8

Applying the same regression model to 2002 and 2007 census data (USDA 2004, 2009) suggests
that the age-sales relationship was relatively stable over the 2002–12 period. The regressions for
2002 and 2007 produced very similar fits (respective R 2 statistics of 0.9920 and 0.9669). Moreover, the sales predicted by the three models for 20, 30, 40, . . . , and 70 years of age were highly
correlated (correlation coefficients of 0.9837 for the correlation between 2002 and 2012 and 0.9877
for the correlation between 2007 and 2012).
9

The age-sales relationship assumed for the typical member is intended to resemble the relationships
one might commonly observe among lifelong members of the cooperative. It is not meant as an
average relationship representative of the organization’s overall membership because the age-sales
relationships of individual members are expected to differ substantially from one another in terms

10 Journal of Cooperatives

Figure 1. Age-sales relationship used in simulations
the regression. The solid portion of the curve, which extends from 25 to 74 chronological years of age (points A and C), represents the member’s 50-year farming
career. The greatest sales occur at 46 years of age (point B). Unlike the Barton and
Schmidt (1988) and Kenkel (2020) analyses, the farming career used here does not
include all years for which sales are nonnegative. Because this analysis is based on
a typical member, the sales corresponding to the youngest and oldest producers in
the census are excluded. Extending the farming career to include the oldest producers also would complicate the analysis of special plans for redeeming equity
held by estates or based on member age.
Choices for the start and end of the member’s farming career were not obvious
given the broad definition of a farm used by USDA,10 the extent to which individuals retire to farming, and the complex set of factors that affect farmers’ attitudes
of both shape and duration. Variations in those age-sales relationships and member ages help explain the different time paths taken by the equity held by the typical member and the total equity of
the cooperative.
The census definition of a farm is “any place from which $1,000 or more of agricultural products
were produced and sold, or normally would have been sold, during the census year” (USDA 2019).
10
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about retirement and their decisions to retire (Kirkpatrick 2013). Although a 2006
survey of Iowa farm operators (Baker and Epley 2009) found that the average retirement age was 67 years, only 23 percent of respondents indicated they would
retire. More than 30 percent indicated they would never retire, and that proportion
was greater in four other states that were surveyed. A majority of Iowa respondents
indicated they would semi-retire, i.e., they would continue to exercise some managerial control and/or provide some labor to the farm.
The retirement age used here was set to 74 years because data from the 2017
Census of Agriculture (USDA 2019) indicate that substantially more producers exit
farming around 74 years of age than around 64 years of age. The typical member
was assumed to begin farming at 25 years of age because census data show that
only a relatively few producers are engaged in farming before that age.11
Equation (6) was used to generate the member’s patronage for each year of the
farming career represented in figure 1. Simulation results are independent of scale.
Thus, the cooperative’s size relative to the member is unimportant, and it is convenient to normalize the member’s patronage so it equals $100,000 in the first year
of the simulations. Patronage refunds received by the member in year i are  pi
where pi is the member’s patronage in year i. Cash and noncash patronage refunds
are respectively c pi and (1 − c )  pi .

The cooperative’s net income is assumed to be returned to members as patronage refund distributions that qualify for exclusion from the cooperative’s taxable
income under Subchapter T of the Internal Revenue Code. Among the requirements for a qualified patronage refund distribution are that the refund must be paid
from the net income of the cooperative according to a preexisting legal obligation,
the cooperative must pay at least 20 percent of the refund in cash, and for tax purposes the member must consent to have the noncash portion treated as if it had been
received in cash.

That definition includes small farms for which the principal operator is retired or is engaged in a
primary occupation other than farming (“Farm Structure,” U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, accessed January 17, 2022, https://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/farm-economy/farm-structure-and-organization/farm-structure/.)
11

Only two of the seven age groups included fewer producers than the groups immediately preceding them. There were 197,418 fewer producers in the 65-to-74-years group than the 55-to-64-years
group. There were 361,930 fewer producers in the 75-years-and-over group than the 65-to-74-years
group. Only 1.5 percent of the nation’s 3.4 million agricultural producers were under 25 years of
age.
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Simulation Models
Spreadsheet models are used to simulate the annual operation of the equity retirement plans. Equity is assumed to grow at the same rate in each of the models.
Under that assumption, the systematic plans provide the cooperative identical levels
of equity. In the model of the revolving fund plan, noncash patronage refunds received by the member are retained as allocated equity for one revolving cycle before they are redeemed in cash. The revolving period is set to 17 years according
to the cooperative model.
In the model of the percentage plan, a fixed percentage of the member’s allocated equity is retired each year. The retired equity is based on the member’s equity
balance at the beginning of the year. Retained patronage refunds added during the
year are included in the beginning balance for the following year. Once the member
quits farming, the equity balance asymptotically approaches zero as the fixed percentage is repeatedly applied to the declining equity base. This process continues
indefinitely unless a special plan is used to close the member’s equity account. The
percentage of equity retired annually is set to 3.9 percent based on equation (3).
Under the base capital plan, the member is required to provide equity in proportion to use during the base period. Each year, the cooperative determines an
equity adjustment intended to bring the member’s equity balance to its required
level. If the equity balance exceeds the equity requirement, the cooperative retires
the equity needed to reduce the balance to the required level; if the balance is less
than the equity requirement, the member must contribute additional equity in the
form of direct cash investments, retained patronage refunds, or per-unit capital retains.12 The base period is set to seven years, the average base period for U.S.
cooperatives in 1991 as reported by Rathbone and Wissman (1993).
For the special plan based on age, the cooperative is assumed to redeem the
member’s equity at age 75, a year after the member quits farming. That age, which
is close to the average age used by cooperatives,13 avoids a situation in which members continue to accumulate equity after their equity accounts are closed. In the

12

Per-unit capital retains are investments members make in a cooperative based on the dollar value
or physical volume of products marketed through it. The retains are withheld by the cooperative
according to a bylaw provision or membership agreement that allows it to make specified deductions
for capital purposes from proceeds due members or cash advances, and they are distinguished from
deductions authorized to cover operating expenses. Per-unit capital retains are allocated to members
and taxed in a manner similar to patronage refund allocations except they are not based on cooperative net income and Subchapter T of the Internal Revenue Code does not require a portion to be
paid back to members in cash for them to be excluded from the cooperative’s taxable income.
13

When U.S. local cooperatives were grouped by total assets, the average age used in 2008 to redeem equity in special plans based on age ranged from 68 to 73 years (Eversull 2010).
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special plan for retiring equity held by the member’s estate, the cooperative is assumed to redeem the equity at 80 years of age, a value consistent with the 55.25year U.S. life expectancy for a 25-year-old beginning farmer (Arias and Xu 2020).
Performance Indicators
Several variables are used to describe and compare the performance of the equity retirement plans: the cash flow the member receives from the cooperative; the
length of the various stages of the cash flow relationship between the cooperative
and member; a measure of the proportionality of the plan; the opportunity costs
borne by the cooperative and member; and the amount of equity supplied by the
member.
Member cash flow is reported on a before-tax basis. Because the systematic
equity retirement plans are based on identical assumptions about the distribution of
patronage refunds and the allocation of member equity, the choice of a plan is neutral in terms of its effect on cash flow. However, there are differences in the timing
of cash flow, which are reflected in present value calculations. In addition, depending on the plan, there may be several years of low cash flow early in a member’s
farming career, and those should be considered when comparing plans. Although
the proportion of patronage refunds paid in cash is usually sufficient for covering
federal income tax, the combination of federal, state, and self-employment taxes
can create negative after-tax cash flows.14 Negative cash flows also can result from
the additional equity investments members must make to meet their equity requirements under the base capital plan.
The cash flow relationship between the cooperative and member can be partitioned into three stages that are useful in analyzing plan performance (Royer and
Shihipar 1997). The stages are defined by whether there is active accumulation or
retirement of member equity. During the investment stage, the member invests
14

Both cash and noncash patronage refunds a member receives as part of a qualified patronage
refund distribution are subject to federal and state income taxes and self-employment tax, the latter
of which consists of a Social Security component and a Medicare component. In 2021, the first
$142,800 of the net earnings of a self-employed individual were subject to Social Security tax at a
12.4 percent rate. All net earnings were subject to a 2.9 percent Medicare tax, and an additional
Medicare tax of 0.9 percent was applied to net earnings in excess of $200,000 for single taxpayers
and $250,000 for married taxpayers filing jointly. When both income taxes and self-employment
tax are considered, it is not difficult to identify situations in which cooperative members may have
faced combined marginal tax rates greater than 40 percent. For example, a single taxpayer in Nebraska would have been subject to a 44.14 percent combined tax rate for taxable income between
$40,525 and $86,375 and a 46.14 percent rate for income between $86,375 and $142,800. The
combined rate would have decreased at $142,800 because earnings were no longer subject to Social
Security tax. However, the rate would once again exceed 40 percent for incomes greater than
$164,925 due to the increasing federal income tax rate and the additional Medicare tax.
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equity in the cooperative but has not participated in the cooperative’s equity program long enough to receive cash redemptions. The investment stage occurs in the
early years of the member’s farming career and is often characterized by low cash
flow. In the intermediate stage, the member continues to make equity investments
but begins receiving cash redemptions. Cash flow is typically higher in this stage
because of equity retirement and expanded patronage. The disinvestment stage begins when the member quits farming. Cash flow consists entirely of the redemption
of equity allocated in earlier years.
The lengths of the stages can serve as meaningful indicators of the performance
of a plan. In particular, a reduction in either the investment or disinvestment stage
can be expected to benefit members. The earlier equity retirement associated with
a shorter investment stage can increase cash flow early in members’ farming careers
when cash is necessary for establishing and expanding their farming operations.
Likewise, a shorter disinvestment stage can improve the cash flow of members who
have retired and are no longer receiving income from farming. Moreover, shorter
disinvestment stages can reduce problems associated with estates.
The measure of proportionality considers the equity held by the cooperative
both during the member’s farming career and after the member quits farming. It is
calculated as
r

 = 1−

 e −e
i =1

i

q

2 ei 0

i0

(7)

i =1

where ei is the equity the member provides at the start of year i, q is the year the
member quits farming, and r is the year the cooperative retires the last of the member’s equity. The term et 0 represents the equity the member would provide under
proportional financing, i.e., if equity were provided in proportion to patronage. It
is calculated as ( pi Pi ) Ei where pi is the member’s patronage, Pi is total patronage, and Ei is total equity at the start of the year. If equity is provided strictly in
proportion to patronage during the member’s entire farming career, ei = ei 0 for all
i so that  = 1 .
Proportional financing could require members to make substantial equity investments early in their farming careers when they have limited access to capital.
On the other hand, members would receive immediate redemption of their remaining equity allocations when they quit farming. The financial demands proportional
financing would impose on young members and the cooperative generally make it
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impracticable. Nonetheless, it can serve as an ideal against which the relative performance of equity retirement plans can be measured.
The opportunity costs examined here are closely related to the proportionality
concept because both are based on ei − ei 0 , the difference between the equity the
member provides each year and the equity that would be provided under proportional financing. By focusing on these opportunity costs, it is possible to identify
the separate impacts disproportionality has on the cooperative and the member and
to assign economic values to those impacts. Two types of opportunities costs are
examined: the costs incurred by the cooperative when members are underinvested
relative to patronage, and those incurred by members when they are overinvested.
The cooperative incurs opportunity costs when a member is underinvested because
the member benefits from capital the cooperative could have put to other uses. A
member incurs opportunity costs when overinvested because the cooperative benefits from capital the member could have put to other uses. Typically, members are
underinvested early in their farming careers when the equity they have accumulated
has not yet risen to levels proportionate to their use of the cooperative. They are
usually overinvested late in their farming careers and after they have quit farming,
when their equity accumulations are disproportionately large relative to use.
In calculating the opportunity cost for year i, the member is considered underinvested if ei  ei 0 and overinvested if ei  ei 0 . If ei  ei 0 , the opportunity cost is

 i = kc ( ei 0 − ei ) where kc is the cooperative’s cost of equity, and  i is assigned to

the cooperative. If ei  ei 0 , the opportunity cost is  i = kc ( ei − ei 0 ) and assigned to
the member. Because an opportunity cost to one party is offset by an economic
benefit to the other, the cooperative’s cost of equity is used in calculating the opportunity costs for both the cooperative and member.
The cooperative’s cost of equity used in calculating the opportunity costs and
the discount rate used in the present value calculations is based on re , the rate of
return on equity. Following Phillips (2001) and Royer (2019), re was chosen because of its role in determining the proportion of patronage refunds the cooperative
can pay in cash and the rates at which it can grow and retire equity. It can be shown
that re is equivalent to the cost of equity determined by the discounted cash flow
method of valuation commonly applied to publicly traded corporations after key
terms are replaced with their cooperative counterparts (Royer 2019).
For comparison purposes, all present values are calculated from the member’s
perspective. The discount rate was set to re − g , which differs from the cooperative’s cost of equity in that it does not include cooperative growth; thus, it only
represents opportunity costs at the member level. It is equivalent to the rate of
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return members earn on their investments in the cooperative, which can be calculated by dividing the cash distributions members receive in a year by allocated equity (Snider and Koller 1971; Royer 2019). The 0.1260 discount rate based on
re − g is considerably higher than the 0.03 rate used by Kenkel (2020). Assumption
of a lower discount rate would amplify the differences between equity retirement
plans and increase the present value of cash flow that occurs late in the member’s
farming career or after retirement.
The amount of equity the member supplies the cooperative is measured in equity units, defined as one dollar of equity held for one year. Total equity supplied
r

r

under a plan is

e .
i =1

i

The monetary value of that equity is

 k e , determined by
i =1

e i

multiplying equity units by the cooperative’s cost of equity. The equity units the
member supplies vary from one plan to another depending on how long the cooperative holds the equity before retiring it. This has important implications for member opportunity costs and the ability of the cooperative to add a special equity retirement plan to an existing systematic plan. The equity supplied is related to proportionality because the cooperative typically holds onto the member’s equity
longer under plans characterized by low proportionality.
Comparison of Systematic Plans
The revolving fund, percentage, and base capital plans are compared in this
section. The comparisons focus on member cash flow, proportionality, and opportunity costs. The equity units the typical member supplies the cooperative are discussed in the context of proportionality.
Member Cash Flow
Figure 2 shows the cash flow the member would receive under each of the three
plans. The figure extends only until the last of the member’s equity is retired under
the revolving fund plan. The equity remaining to be retired under the percentage
plan is not shown. Table 3 reports several numerical indicators of the performance
of the plans.
Initially, member cash flow associated with the revolving fund plan consists
entirely of cash patronage refunds, which increase at first and then decrease as they
follow the age-sales relationship in figure 1. After one revolving cycle, there is a
large jump in cash flow as the member begins receiving the redemption of retained
patronage refunds allocated earlier. At the end of the member’s farming career,
there is a large decline in cash flow as it no longer includes cash patronage refunds
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Figure 2. Member cash flow under systematic equity retirement plans
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Table 3. Performance of systematic equity retirement plans
Revolving fund
Proportionality

0.6425

Percentage
0.2430

Base capital
0.8947

Dollars
Member cash flow:
All stages
Present value

88,721
8,716

88,721
9,521

88,721
7,988

Cooperative
Present value

13,426
7,843

16,986
8,652

9,799
5,924

Member
Present value

53,116
990

123,912
681

9,799
83

66,542

140,898

19,598

Opportunity costs:

Total

Years
Cash flow stages:
Investment
Intermediate
Disinvestment

17
33
17

1
49
∞

7
43
7

and consists entirely of the redemption of retained patronage refunds in the revolving fund. The redemption of retained patronage refunds continues for one more
revolving cycle, after which the balance of the member’s equity account is zero.
Under the percentage plan, the member begins receiving redemption of retained
patronage refunds in the second year. Because redemption starts almost immediately, there is not a large jump in cash flow as with the revolving fund plan. Instead,
cash flow gradually increases and then decreases as it follows the age-sales relationship. There is a substantial drop in cash flow at the end of the member’s farming career when cash patronage refunds cease and cash flow consists entirely of
equity retirement. From that point, the member’s equity balance gradually declines
as a fixed percentage of the equity is redeemed annually. Without a special plan to
close out the member’s equity account, the cash flow from redemption will continue
indefinitely.
In the case of the base capital plan, the member’s cash flow is low in the first
years when members are required to make additional equity investments to meet
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their equity requirements under the plan. Once a member’s equity balance is proportionate to use, cash flow jumps, after which it follows the age-patronage relationship. There is a slight inflection when the member’s farming career ends and
patronage ceases.
Overall, the base capital plan provides the member the greatest cash flow during
the middle years of the simulations whereas the percentage plan results in the least.
In the early years, the cash flow from the percentage plan is greatest because the
redemption of retained patronage refunds begins almost immediately. The base
capital plan results in the least cash flow during the early years because of the additional investments underinvested members are required to make. At the end of
the member’s farming career, the revolving fund plan produces the largest member
cash flow, but only because much of the member’s equity has already been redeemed in the case of the base capital plan. In fact, under the base capital plan, all
of the member’s equity has been redeemed well before the last equity has been
redeemed under the revolving fund plan. Even after the revolving fund plan has
retired the last of the member’s equity, a substantial amount of equity remains to
be retired under the percentage plan.
Although total member cash flow is the same for all three equity retirement
plans, the present value of member cash flow varies from one plan to another. The
present value is highest for the percentage plan because of the higher cash flow
early in the member’s farming year. The present value is least for the base capital
plan because of the low cash flow in early years due to the additional equity investments underinvested members must make.
Proportionality
Proportionality is greatest for the base capital plan and least for the percentage
plan. Indeed, the proportionality of the percentage plan is only a fraction of that of
the base capital plan. The proportionality of the revolving fund plan is substantially
higher than the percentage plan but considerably lower than the base capital plan.
Figure 3 compares the equity the member supplies under each plan to the
amount that would be supplied by proportional financing. For any age i, the distance between the curve for a particular plan and the curve for proportional financing represents the difference in the equity provided under the plan ( ei ) and proportional financing ( ei 0 ). Those differences serve as the basis for the calculation of
proportionality in equation (7).
All three plans lag proportional financing in both the accumulation and retirement of equity. The lags are least pronounced for the base capital plan, which follows the profile for proportional financing more closely than either the revolving
fund or percentage plans. The percentage plan exhibits the largest lags of the three
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Table 4. Equity supplied by member under systematic and special plans

Revolving fund

Percentage

Base capital

Systematic plan only
Equity units
Value (dollars)

758,689
132,756

1,142,938
199,992

531,863
93,066

With special plan (age)
Equity units
Value (dollars)

694,735
121,565

714,075
124,949

522,092
91,356

733,795
128,400

791,517
138,500

531,593
93,019

With special plan (estate)
Equity units
Value (dollars)

Net change
With special plan (age)
Equity units
Value (dollars)

-63,954
-11,191

-428,863
-75,043

-9,772
-1,710

-24,893
-4,356

-351,422
-61,492

-270
-47

With special plan (estate)
Equity units
Value (dollars)

plans. These observations are consistent with the values for the proportionality
measure presented in table 3.
The area under each curve represents the total equity units the member would
supply the cooperative under that plan. Those areas correspond to the numerical
values presented in the first row of table 4. The equity units supplied under the
base capital plan are identical to the units that would be supplied by proportional
financing. The principal difference between the base capital plan and proportional
financing is the lags in equity accumulation and retirement that occur under the
plan. The cooperative holds substantially more equity units under the revolving
fund and percentage plans than under the base capital plan; it holds the most equity
units under the percentage plan. Although the three plans are equivalent in terms
of the overall equity they provide the cooperative, they differ in their impacts on
individual members. Because the cooperative holds the typical member’s equity
longer under the revolving fund and percentage plans, member opportunity costs
are greater under those plans.
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Opportunity Costs
Figure 4 illustrates cooperative and member opportunity costs for the plans.
Under all three plans, the cooperative incurs opportunity costs early in the member’s farming career when the member is underinvested relative to patronage. As
the member accumulates equity, the cooperative’s opportunity costs diminish until
the member is eventually fully invested. With additional equity accumulation, the
member becomes overinvested and begins incurring opportunity costs.
The pattern of opportunity costs differs from one plan to another, depending on
how equity is accumulated and retired. In the figure, the point at which cooperative
opportunity costs are replaced by member opportunity costs is labeled A for the
revolving fund plan, B for the percentage plan, and C for the base capital plan. The
greatest opportunity costs are usually associated with the percentage plan. Generally, both cooperative and member opportunity costs are larger for the percentage
plan than the other plans with the exception of a period in the middle of the member’s farming career when member opportunity costs are larger for the revolving
fund plan. Both cooperative and member opportunity costs are usually lowest under the base capital plan.
Modifications of the Base Capital Plan
The base capital plan performs well with respect to proportionality and other
performance indicators. However, the need for young members to make additional
equity investments to meet their equity requirements can place a substantial financial burden on them and make it harder for cooperatives to attract new members.
In this section, several modifications of the base capital plan are examined to determine whether they can improve the cash flow of young members without unduly
compromising the plan’s performance. The modifications include changing the
length of the base period used to calculate equity requirements, relaxing the equity
requirements for underinvested members so additional investments are unnecessary, and operating a variable cash patronage refund program in conjunction with
the plan. In a variable cash patronage refund program, underinvested members
receive less of their patronage refunds in cash than other members. Such a plan can
be used to accelerate the investments of underinvested members by increasing the
noncash portions of their patronage refund allocations.
Plans with five-year and ten-year base periods, a plan in which the equity requirements for underinvested members are relaxed, and a plan with a variable cash
patronage refunds program are compared to a basic plan with a seven-year base
period. Under the plan with relaxed equity requirements, it is assumed that underinvested members receive both cash and noncash patronage refunds but do not participate in equity retirement. In the variable cash patronage refund program, the
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proportion of patronage refunds a member receives in cash is assumed to follow
this schedule:
Proportion equity requirement met ( )

Proportion cash patronage refunds (c)

  0.25

0.20

0.25    0.50

0.25

0.50    0.75

0.30

0.75    1.00

0.40

1.00  

0.50

Results from varying the base period are displayed in table 5, which includes
information on the additional equity investments the typical member must make to
meet the equity requirements of the plan; the results are presented graphically in
figure 5. A plan in which the equity requirements for underinvested members are
relaxed and a plan combined with variable cash patronage refunds are compared to
the basic plan in table 6 and figure 6.
As shown in table 5, reducing the base period shortens the investment and disinvestment stages and lengthens the intermediate stage. Reducing the base period
also increases proportionality and decreases both cooperative and member opportunity costs. On the other hand, it lowers the present value of member cash flow.
This is due primarily to the additional equity investments members must make during the shorter base period. As a result of those investments, cash flow during the
investment stage is lowest for the plan with the five-year base period, as illustrated
in figure 5. Cash flow during the disinvestment stage is also lowest for the fiveyear base period. However, cash flow during the intermediate stage is higher for
the five-year base period than the others.
A major drawback of the shorter base period is the greater financial pressure it
places on members early in their farming careers. Reducing the base period increases the additional investments members must make during the investment
stage, and those investments reduce cash flow substantially. Indeed, for the plan
with a five-year base period, member before-tax cash flow is negative during the
investment stage.
Of course, lengthening the base period produces results opposite those from
reducing the base period. An important effect of a longer base period is that it
provides members more time to meet their equity requirements. Consequently, the
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Table 5. Effects of varying base period

Proportionality

5-yr. base

7-yr. base

0.9209

0.8947

10-yr. base
0.8557

Dollars
Member cash flow:
All stages
Present value

88,721
7,163

88,721
7,988

88,721
9,019

Cooperative
Present value

7,361
4,764

9,799
5,924

13,429
7,375

Member
Present value

7,361
67

9,799
83

13,429
101

66,542

140,898

19,598

4,927
985

3,724
532

1,570
157

Opportunity costs:

Total
Additional investments:
Total
Average

Years
Cash flow stages:
Investment
Intermediate
Disinvestment

5
45
5

7
43
7

10
40
10

cash flow received by the typical member is higher during the first few years when
the member is building equity to bring it into line with use.
Relaxing the equity requirements for underinvested members also provides
them more time to increase their equity investments, while resulting in only a modest diminution in performance relative to the other systematic plans. Although there
is an increase in cooperative opportunity costs, the present value of member cash
flow increases, and there is only a slight decrease in proportionality. Relaxing the
equity requirements improves cash flow in early years, but it extends the investment
stage. As figure 6 shows, cash flow is lower than under the basic plan toward the
end of the extended investment stage. By allowing members more time to build
their equity investments, the cooperative takes on a greater financial burden, which
is reflected by its increased opportunity costs. Because the effects of relaxing the

-0.5

0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

25

30

35

40

45

55

60

5-yr. base

7-yr. base

10-yr. base

Member Chronological Age (Yrs.)

50
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Table 6. Effects of relaxed equity requirements and variable cash patronage
refunds
Relaxed equity
requirements

Basic plan
Proportionality

0.8947

0.8703

Variable cash
patronage
refunds
0.8890

Dollars
Member cash flow:
All stages
Present value

88,721
7,988

88,721
9,456

88,721
8,378

Cooperative
Present value

9,799
5,924

14,338
7,963

10,864
6,467

Member
Present value

9,799
83

9,799
83

9,799
83

19,598

24,137

20,663

Opportunity costs:

Total

Years
Cash flow stages:
Investment
Intermediate
Disinvestment

7
43
7

13
37
7

9
41
7

equity requirements occur early in the member’s farming career, member opportunity costs are unaffected. An important advantage of relaxed equity requirements
is that they avoid subjecting members to negative after-tax cash flows early in their
farming careers.
The effects of a variable cash patronage refunds are similar. However, the investment stage is shorter because members do not need as much time to bring their
equity balances into line with patronage. Therefore, proportionality is greater than
when the equity requirements are relaxed although it is still less than in the basic
plan. The present value of member cash flow is lower than when the equity requirements are relaxed, but so are the cooperative’s opportunity costs. Both values
are larger than in the basic plan. One disadvantage of the variable cash patronage
refund program is that members may still experience negative after-tax cash flows
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Table 7. Revolving fund plan in combination with special plans

Revolving fund
plan only

Proportionality

0.6425

Revolving fund plan
with special plan
Age
(at 75 yrs.)
0.7026

Estate
(at 80 yrs.)
0.6659

Dollars
Member cash flow:
All stages
Present value
Disinvestment stage
Present value

88,721
8,716
10,644
5,237

88,721
8,728
10,644
9,453

88,721
8,719
10,644
6,263

Cooperative
Present value

13,426
7,843

13,426
6,729

13,426
7,843

Member
Present value

53,116
990

41,925
972

48,760
985

66,542

53,352

62,186

Opportunity costs:

Total

Years
Cash flow stages:
Investment
Intermediate
Disinvestment

17
33
17

17
33
1

17
33
6

if their marginal tax rates exceed the proportion of patronage refunds they receive
in cash.
Effects of Special Plans
This section reports on analyses of how the addition of a special plan affects the
performance of the systematic plans. Two special plans are considered: a plan that
redeems the member’s equity based on age (at 75 years of age) and a plan that
redeems the equity held by the member’s estate (at 80 years of age). The results of
those analyses are presented in tables 7–9. Because the special plans redeem equity
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Table 8. Percentage plan in combination with special plans

Percentage plan
only

Proportionality

0.2430

Percentage plan
with special plan
Age
(at 75 yrs.)
0.6462

Estate
(at 80 yrs.)
0.5734

Dollars
Member cash flow:
All stages
Present value
Disinvestment stage
Present value

88,721
9,521
17,426
4,123

88,721
9,555
17,426
15,476

88,721
9,537
17,426
9,262

Cooperative
Present value

16,986
8,652

16,986
8,652

16,986
8,652

Member
Present value

123,912
681

48,869
634

62.42
659

140,898

65,855

79,406

Opportunity costs:

Total

Years
Cash flow stages:
Investment
Intermediate
Disinvestment

1
49
∞

1
49
1

1
49
6

several decades after the member’s farming career begins, their effects on the present value of member cash flow are not easily discerned when present values are
calculated at 25 years of age. To bring those effects into sharper focus, the tables
include the member cash flow during the disinvestment stage (i.e., after the member
retires); the corresponding present values are calculated at 75 years of age. The
special plans do not affect the level or timing of the cooperative’s opportunity costs
because all opportunity costs are borne by the member at the time the plans are
implemented.
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Table 9. Base capital plan in combination with special plans

Base capital plan
only

Proportionality

0.8947

Base capital plan
with special plan
Age
(at 75 yrs.)
0.9039

Estate
(at 80 yrs.)
0.8950

Dollars
Member cash flow:
All stages
Present value
Disinvestment stage
Present value

88,721
7,988
4,289
2,975

88,721
7,990
4,289
3,809

88,721
7,988
4,289
2,990

Cooperative
Present value

9,799
5,924

9,799
5,924

9,799
5,924

Member
Present value

9,799
83

8,089
79

9,752
83

19,598

17,888

19,551

Opportunity costs:

Total

Years
Cash flow stages:
Investment
Intermediate
Disinvestment

7
43
7

7
43
1

7
43
6

As reported in table 7, the special plan based on age improves the performance
of the revolving fund plan by shortening the disinvestment stage and reducing
member opportunity costs. The plan also increases the present value of member
cash flow after retirement and improves proportionality. The effects of the plan for
redeeming the equity held by the member’s estate are similar, but they are weaker
because of the five-year difference in timing.
The special plans produce their greatest effects when used in conjunction with
the percentage plan. As shown in table 8, the special plan based on age results in a
substantial reduction in the disinvestment stage and a severalfold increase in the
present value of member cash flow after retirement. Member opportunity costs are
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cut by more than one-half, and proportionality more than doubles. Although not as
large, the improvements brought by the plan for redeeming the equity held by the
member’s estate are still substantial. In general terms, the proportionality of the
percentage plan is still considerably less than the revolving fund and base capital
plans when those plans are combined with special plans. Nonetheless, adding a
special plan to the percentage plan results in a level of proportionality comparable
to the revolving fund plan without a special plan.
Because the disinvestment stage corresponding to the base capital plan is already fairly short, the effects of the special plans on performance are relatively
small. As shown in table 9, the special plan based on age reduces the disinvestment
stage by six years, but the associated effects on the present value of member postretirement cash flow, member opportunity costs, and proportionality are modest.
Because the plan for the member’s estate reduces the disinvestment stage by only
one year, its effects are negligible.
Table 4 reports the equity units the member supplies the cooperative when the
special plans are operated in conjunction with a systematic plan. As the table
demonstrates, the addition of a special plan to an existing systematic plan results in
a reduction in equity units. In general, the reduction due to a special plan is inversely related to the performance of the systematic plan (table 3) and directly related to the benefits associated with the special plan (tables 7–9). The addition of
special plans to the percentage plan results in the greatest reductions in equity units.
The addition of special plans to the base capital plan results in comparatively minor
reductions in equity because the special plans produce only modest improvements
in performance.
Although implementation of a special plan generally improves the performance
of the cooperative’s equity retirement program, there is a cost to the cooperative
because the redeemed equity can no longer be put to its current uses. For example,
consider a cooperative that operates a revolving fund plan. If the cooperative were
to add a special plan for redeeming the equity of members at 75 years of age, the
equity supplied by the typical member would be reduced by 63,954 equity units.
Unless the cooperative replaces that reduction with equity from other sources, it
must lengthen its revolving period, reduce its growth, or lower the proportion of
patronage refunds it pays in cash. The loss to the cooperative and its members due
to those effects represents an opportunity cost equal to the economic value of the
equity units no longer available, $11,191 in this example. The total opportunity
costs associated with a special plan would consider the equity of other members
also retired under the plan.
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Discussion
The relative performance of the systematic equity retirement plans is apparent
from the results displayed in table 3. By almost all indicators of performance, the
base capital plan performs better than the other two plans. Similarly, the percentage
plan exhibits poorer performance than the other plans. The base capital plan is
associated with the greatest proportionality while the percentage plan is associated
with the least. Both cooperative and member opportunity costs are lowest with the
base capital plan; they are highest with the percentage plan.
Only in terms of the present value of member cash flow does the percentage
plan yield the best results. The superior performance of the percentage plan in
terms of present value can be attributed to the higher cash flow in the early years of
the member’s farming career when equity retirement begins almost immediately
under the plan. During that period, member cash flow is low under the base capital
plan because of the additional equity investments the member must make to meet
the equity requirements of the plan.
The present value comparisons do not represent a strong argument against the
base capital plan’s overall superiority for two reasons. First, the ranking of plans
relative to the present value of member cash flow is sensitive to changes in the
discount rate. The discount rate used in calculating the present values in table 3 is
relatively high, and the base capital plan yields the greatest present value at lower
discount rates.15 Second, when the cash flow of the cooperative’s entire membership is considered, the present value of member cash flow is identical for the three
systematic plans. From equation (2), it is clear that the cash flow available for
equity retirement in any particular year is fixed given the proportion of patronage
refunds paid in cash and the equity growth rate. Thus, the cash flow members receive from the cooperative and the present value of that cash flow are independent
of the equity retirement plan in place. So from an aggregate perspective, no plan
can be preferred over another on the basis of the present value of the cash flow
members receive.
Notwithstanding the greater present value for the typical member under the percentage plan, the base capital plan is clearly the best-performing plan with respect
to achieving proportionality and reducing both cooperative and member opportunity costs. Yet despite its performance, only a small proportion of U.S. agricultural cooperatives use to the plan for the accumulation and retirement of member
equity. The best explanation for the low use of the base capital plan is the financial
burden it places on members early in their farming careers when they must make

15

Recall that the discount rate used to calculate the present values in table 3 is 0.1260. For positive
discount rates of 0.0699 or less, the present value associated with the base capital plan exceeds those
for the percentage and revolving fund plans.
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additional equity investments in the form of direct cash investments, retained patronage refunds, or per-unit capital retains to meet their equity requirements. As a
result of those investments, member after-tax cash flow can be negative. In fact, if
the base period used to calculate the equity requirements is short enough, the typical
member’s cash flow can be negative even before taxes.16
Two modifications of the base capital plan offer means for mitigating the problem of the low cash flow received by members early in their farming careers. Relaxing the equity requirements for underinvested members provides them more
time to increase their equity investments while resulting in only a modest diminution in performance relative to the other systematic plans. There is only a slight
decrease in proportionality, and younger members are not subjected to negative
after-tax cash flows. Extending the base period from seven years to ten years has
similar effects. Although proportionality declines more than when the equity requirements are relaxed, it still exceeds the proportionality under the revolving fund
and percentage plans. With the longer base period, the cash flow of younger members is increased but not as much as when the equity requirements are relaxed. The
variable cash patronage refund program offers the greatest proportionality of the
three modifications of the base capital plan, but it does not entirely eliminate the
problem of low cash flow for younger members. The cash flow received by young
members is still low, and the after-tax cash flow can indeed be negative if their
marginal tax rates exceed the proportion of patronage refunds they receive in cash.
The percentage plan performs poorly relative to the other two systematic plans.
Proportionality is extremely low for the plan, and opportunity costs, especially
member opportunity costs, are substantially greater than in the other plans. Early
redemption provides members higher cash flow early in their farming careers, and
that cash flow may improve the cooperative’s ability to attract new members. Otherwise, there is little to recommend the plan for use in local or centralized cooperatives. The plan probably works best for federalized regional cooperatives that
maintain relatively stable long-term relationships with their cooperative members.
Although special plans for redeeming equity held by estates or based on member age provide a way to improve the performance of systematic plans, two factors
may limit their use. In some cases, the loss in equity and the concomitant opportunity costs attributable to a special plan may discourage its adoption. This may
contribute to explaining the low incidence of special plans used in conjunction with
16

A cooperative can avoid negative member cash flow by issuing patronage refund or per-unit capital retain allocations in nonqualified form. Use of nonqualified allocations shifts the tax burden
from members to the cooperative until the allocations are eventually redeemed in cash. The redemptions are then included in the members’ taxable income and deducted from the cooperative’s
taxable income Thus, the cooperative can avoid imposing a tax burden on members early in their
farming careers when cash flow may be low. Instead, the tax is deferred until later when it can be
offset by cash redemptions.
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the percentage plan, for which the loss of equity and the associated opportunity costs
are quite large relative to the other systematic plans. In other cases, special plans
may do little to improve the performance of a systematic plan that already performs
well. This applies in particular to the base capital plan, which performs better than
the other systematic plans even without the help of a special plan. By their nature,
special plans address problems associated with the equity held by members after
they have retired from farming. Special plans do nothing to eliminate the problems
of low cash flow associated with the base capital plan, which typically occur early
in a member’s farming career. In general, special plans may offer the greatest advantages to cooperatives that operate revolving fund plans. Cooperatives with revolving fund plans may experience a balance of potential benefits and opportunity
costs that encourages the adoption of a special plan. These observations suggest an
explanation for the low incidence of special plans among cooperatives that employ
percentage and base capital plans relative to revolving fund plans.17
A cooperative’s decision to replace its existing equity retirement plan with another plan can be complicated by the differential impacts the transition is expected
to have on members. Consider the decision of whether to replace a revolving fund
plan with a base capital plan. Older, overinvested members might benefit from the
change because their equity allocations would be retired more quickly. However,
younger, underinvested members could be disadvantaged because of the additional
equity investments they would need to make. A decision to adopt a new plan will
depend on resolving the conflicting interests of various member groups. 18 The difficulty of reconciling those interests may make it harder for a cooperative to change
plans because the complexity of the decision tends to favor the status quo (Hessami
and Resnjanskij 2019).
17

According to Eversull (2010), 18.6 percent of U.S. local cooperatives that operated revolving fund
plans in 2008 used special plans to redeem equity according to member age, and 47.5 percent used
special plans to redeem equity held by estates. In contrast, of those cooperatives that operated percentage plans, 14.1 percent redeemed equity according to age, and only 13.7 percent redeemed equity held by estates. Because the addition of a special plan is expected to improve the performance
of the percentage plan the most, the relatively low use of special plans in conjunction with percentage plans can likely be attributed to the associated opportunity costs. Of the cooperatives that maintained base capital plans, 2.9 percent redeemed equity based on age, and 4.6 percent redeemed equity
held by estates. The low frequency of use among cooperatives with base capital plans can be explained by the strong performance of the base capital plan in the absence of special plans.
18

An approach similar to that of Royer and Shihipar (1997) might be taken to analyze the decision
to change equity retirement plans. That paper examined how an individual member’s preferences
regarding patronage refunds and equity revolvement are affected by age and other factors. Using
an estimated member distribution and a collective choice model based on the preferences of the
median voter, the paper predicted which patronage refund and equity revolvement practices would
dominate under selected member and cooperative characteristics.

36 Journal of Cooperatives

References
Arias, E., and J. Xu. 2020. “United States Life Tables, 2018.” National Vital Statistics Reports
69(12):1–44. Hyattsville, Md.: National Center for Health Statistics, Nov. 17.
Baarda, J.R. 1982. State Incorporation Statutes for Farmer Cooperatives. Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Department of Agriculture, ACS Coop. Info. Rep. 30, Oct.
Baker, J., and E. Epley. 2009. Iowa Farmers Business and Transfer Plans. Ames, Ia.: Iowa State
University, Extension, and Outreach, Beginning Farmer Center.
Barton, D.G. 1989. “Principles.” In Cooperatives in Agriculture, ed. D.W. Cobia, 21–34. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall.
Barton, D.G., and R.L. Schmidt. 1988. “An Evaluation of Equity Redemption Alternatives in Centralized Cooperatives.” Journal of Agricultural Cooperation 3:39–58.
Cobia, D.W., J.S. Royer, R.A. Wissman, D.P. Smith, D.R. Davidson, S.D. Lurya, J.W. Mather, P.F.
Brown, and K.P. Krueger. 1982. Equity Redemption: Issues and Alternatives for Farmer Cooperatives. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Agriculture, ACS Res. Rep. 23, Oct.
Eversull, E.E. 2010. Cooperative Equity Redemption. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Agriculture, RBS Res. Rep. 220, June.
———. 2011. Cooperative Financial Profile, 2008. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Agriculture, RBS Res. Rep. 222, June.
Frederick, D.A. 1990. Sample Legal Documents for Cooperatives. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Agriculture, RBS Coop. Info. Rep. 40, May.
GAO. 1979. Family Farmers Need Cooperatives—But Some Issues Need to Be Resolved. Washington, D.C.: Comptroller General of the United States, Report to the Congress, CED-79-106, July
26.
Hessami, Z., and S. Resnjanskij. 2019. “Complex Ballot Propositions, Individual Voting Behavior,
and Status Quo Bias.” European Journal of Political Economy 58:82–101.
Kenkel, P. 2020. “Comparison of Alternative Equity Management Systems.” Journal of Cooperatives 35:103–28.
Kirkpatrick, J. 2013. “Retired Farmer—An Elusive Concept.” Choices 28(2):1–5.
Phillips, C. 2001. “Revisiting Equity Management: The Art of Wise Compromise.” Management
Quarterly 42(4):24–34.
Rathbone, R.C., and R.A. Wissman. 1993. Equity Redemption and Member Equity Allocation Practices of Agricultural Cooperatives. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Agriculture, ACS
Res. Rep. 124, Oct.

Vol. 36 [2022]

37

Royer, J.S. 1993. “Patronage Refunds, Equity Retirement, and Growth in Farmer Cooperatives.”
Agricultural Finance Review 53:42–54.
———. 2019. “Measuring the Cost of Capital in Cooperative Businesses. Agribusiness: An International Journal 35(2):249–64.
Royer, J.S., and D.W. Cobia. 1984. “Measuring the Equity Redemption Performance of Farmer
Cooperatives.” North Central Journal of Agricultural Economics 6(1):105–12.
Royer, J.S., and G. McKee. 2021. “Optimal Capital Structure in Agricultural Cooperatives and Implications for Equity Retirement.” Agricultural Finance Review 81(2):277–91.
Royer, J.S., and M.L.M. Shihipar. 1997. “Individual Patron Preferences, Collective Choice, and
Cooperative Equity Revolvement Practices.” Journal of Cooperatives 12:47–61.
Simonton, D.K. 1988. “Age and Outstanding Achievement: What Do We Know after a Century of
Research?” Psychological Bulletin 104(2):251–67.
———. 1989. “Age and Creative Productivity: Nonlinear Estimation of an Information-Processing
Model.” International Journal of Aging and Human Development 29(1):23–37.
Snider, T.E., and E.F. Koller. 1971. The Cost of Capital in Minnesota Dairy Cooperatives. St. Paul,
Minn.: University of Minnesota Agric. Exp. Stat. Bull. 503.
Tauer, L. 2019. “Farmer Productivity by Age in the United States.” International Journal of Agricultural Management 8(2):74–80.
USDA. 1987. Positioning Farmer Cooperatives for the Future: A Report to Congress. Washington,
D.C.: Agricultural Cooperative Service., Oct. 1.
———. 2004. 2002 Census of Agriculture. Washington, D.C.: National Agricultural Statistics Service, United States Summary and State Data, Vol. 1, Geographic Area Series, Pt. 51, AC-02A-51, June.
———. 2009. 2007 Census of Agriculture. Washington, D.C.: National Agricultural Statistics Service, United States Summary and State Data, Vol. 1, Geographic Area Series, Pt. 51, AC-07A-51, Dec.
———. 2014. 2012 Census of Agriculture. Washington, D.C.: National Agricultural Statistics Service, United States Summary and State Data, Vol. 1, Geographic Area Series, Pt. 51, AC-12A-51, May.
———. 2019. 2017 Census of Agriculture. Washington, D.C.: National Agricultural Statistics Service, United States Summary and State Data, Vol. 1, Geographic Area Series, Pt. 51, AC-17A-51, Apr.
———. 2021. Agricultural Cooperative Statistics 2019. Washington, D.C.: Rural Development
Service Report 83, Jan.

